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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
EQUITY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LABOR DIsPUTE.-Action by plaintiffs to ell-
poin defendants from picketing plaintiff's restaurant. From an interlocutory or-
der refusing to grant a temporary injunction plaintiffs appeal. The facts show
that because of a refusal by plaintiffs to employ only union help in their res-
taurant, defendants called a strike, picketed the restaurant, and induced union
truck drivers to refuse to deliver supplies to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that the
picketing resulted in a reduction of receipts from $50 to $65 per day. Held, order
affirmed. Scofes et al. v. Helinar et al., (Ind., 1933) 187 N.E. 662.
The question raised in this case was whether the court could enjoin peaceful
picketing when it resulted in loss to the plaintiffs' business. The court held that
such picketing was legally justified and if lawfully conducted could not be en-
joined, even though it may have caused pecuniary loss to the business picketed.
In accord: Karges Furniture Co. v. A-nalganiated, etc. Union, 165 Ind. 421, 75
N.E. 877, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 788, 6 Ann. Cas. 829 (1905); Thomas v. City of In-
dianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550, 35 A.L.R. 1194 (1924) ; American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66
L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360 (1921) ; Stillwell Theater, Inc v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405,
182 N.E. 63, 84 A.L.R. 6 (1932). Not all courts view picketing in this way and
will enjoin admittedly lawful and peaceful picketing. Clarage v. Luphringer, 202
Mich. 612, 168 N.W. 440 (1918) ; Baldwin Lionber Co. v. Local 560, 91 N.J. Eq.
240, 109 Atl. 147 (1920).
The Indiana Supreme Court felt that no rights of the plaintiffs were violated
by the picketing; that the plaintiffs as owners of a restaurant had no inherent
property right to the patronage of their customers. If a restaurant underpays
its help and seeks to take advantage of a surplus in the labor market, its em-
ployees have the right to advertise this treatment to the public, and to inform
the patrons of the restaurant that the employers are unfair to organized labor.
S. A. Clark Lunch Co. v. Cleveland, etc., Local 106, 22 Ohio App.265, 154 N.E.
362 (1926). "The fact that such action may result in incidental injury to the em-
ployers does not in itself constitute a justification for issuing an injunction
against such acts." Stillwell Theater, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra. The patrons, having
been informed of the facts, have the choice of continuing their patronage or not.
If they discontinue it, the employer suffers a loss in decreased receipts.
Because the Indiana Court did not regard the right to patronage as a prop-
erty right, its refusal to grant an injunction does not constitute a deprivation
of plaintiff's property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Courts are by no means unanimous on this point. Many of
them feel that this right of patronage, to do business unhampered, should be pro-
tected and will call it a property right. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup.
Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375 (1921). In this case a statute (1464 Re-
vised Stat. of Arizona, 1913) prohibiting the issuing of an injunction in labor
disputes was held unconstitutional.
The court will often say that there must be lawful picketing carried on for a
lawful purpose. Truax v. Corrigan, supra. The determination of what is a lawful
object gives the courts a great deal of latitude. Picketing to force an employer
to take back employees he has laid off has been called unlawful, Benito Rovira
Co. v. Yampolsky, 187 N.Y.S. 894 (1921). Picketing to compel an employer to
allow his mines to be unionized is also unlawful, Hitchman Coal and Coke Co.
v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260, L.R.A. 1918C, 497 (1917).
The distinction between lawful or peaceful and unlawful picketing also gives
the courts an opportunity to exercise considerable judicial discretion. Where
RECENT DECISIONS
there is unlawful picketing the courts will enjoin it to prevent irreparable in-
jury to property and property rights. However, in so doing, they will frequently
have to make fine distinctions between peaceful persuasion and annoyance, moral
coercion and intimidation. Truax v. Corrigan, supra.
The Wisconsin legislature tries to make this distinction between lawful and
unlawful picketing and in 1931 legalized peaceful picketing. Thus section 268.20,
(1), (e), Wis. Stats., provides that "Giving publicity to and obtaining or com-
municating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any
place where any person or persons may lawfully be, without intimidation or
coercion, (italics writer's) or by any other method not irvolving fraud, violence,
breach of the peace, (italics writer's) or threat thereof" shall be legal. Subsec-
tion (2) of the same section provides that "No court, nor any judge or judges
thereof, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction which, in specific or general terms, prohibits any person
or persons from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the foregoing acts."
(i.e., peaceful patrolling and picketing, etc.). It is hardly necessary to point out
how much room for judicial discretion remains, and necessarily so.
There has geen in the past a blind abuse of the injunction power by the
courts, resulting in greater class hatred, and in more contemptuous disre-
spect for justice than ever before. Statutes such as the above and the Federal
Statute passed in 1921 limiting the courts somewhat in their power to grant in-
junctions in trade disputes, combined with a more liberal public opinion and a
more socially minded judiciary than has existed in the past, are leading to a
more impartial adjudication of labor disputes.
CAROLINE AGGER,
ERNEST 0. EISENBERG.
SURETYSHIP-DEFENSES OF SURETY-ESTOPPEL.-By the terms of a trust agree-
ment the creditors of a construction company agreed to be paid pro rata from the
proceeds of a proposed mortgage and to furnish materials needed-for the com-
pletion of a building on land owned by the company. The plaintiff, a creditor,
executed the agreement only because the defendant, a trustee, guaranteed, indi-
vidually, to pay the balance of its account remaining unpaid after the distribu-
tion of the balance of the proceeds of said mortgage. The materials were fur-
nished and the work of completion started. The mortgagee of the proposed
mortgage could not advance the funds. The trustees, without knowledge or con-
sent of the plaintiff, negotiated in place of the proposed mortgage another mort-
gage of larger denomination. The proceeds of this mortgage were insufficient
to meet the necessary disbursements and the creditors received nothing. The
plaintiff sued on the guaranty. Motions for nonsuit and directed verdicts by both
parties were refused. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff covering its
full account. From the judgment the defendant appeals on grounds of improper
submission to the jury. Held, that the case was properly submitted to the jury.
Judgment affirmed. Mosaic Tile Co. v. Jones, (N.J. App., 1933) 168 Atl. 629.
The defendant for one defense contended that the placing of a new and
larger mortgage released his obligation on the guaranty. A variation from the
terms of the original contract is different from an alteration. Ap alteration of a
material character releases the guarantor because the contract is destroyed. A
variation from the terms of the contract gives the surety an equitable defense.
